Centerblue.org

Just when you think the news can’t get any worse from Iraq, it does.

The Washington Post reports on newly disclosed details of a classified Marine Corps intelligence report, which says the US military is no longer defeat the bloody insurgency in Iraq’s western Anbar province, or counter al-Qaeda’s rising popularity there. An updated assessment in mid-November also said the situation had not improved.

Iranian influence bears a role on the situation:

True or not, the memo says, “from the Sunni perspective, their greatest fears have been realized: Iran controls Baghdad and Anbaris have been marginalized.” Moreover, most Sunnis now believe it would be unwise to count on or help U.S. forces because they are seen as likely to leave the country before imposing stability.

Between al-Qaeda’s violence, Iran’s influence and an expected U.S. drawdown, “the social and political situation has deteriorated to a point” that U.S. and Iraqi troops “are no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar,” the assessment found.

Sunnis in the province are desperate, and all levels of government have either collapsed or been completely infiltrated by Al-Qaeda:

Read as a complete assessment, it paints a stark portrait of a failed province and of the country’s Sunnis — once dominant under Saddam Hussein — now desperate, fearful and impoverished. They have been increasingly abandoned by religious and political leaders who have fled to neighboring countries, and other leaders have been assassinated. And unlike Iraq’s Shiite majority, or Kurdish groups in the north, the Sunnis are without oil and other natural resources. The report notes that illicit oil trading is providing millions of dollars to al-Qaeda while “official profits appear to feed Shiite cronyism in Baghdad.”

As a result, “the potential for economic revival appears to be nonexistent” in Anbar, the report says. The Iraqi government, dominated by Iranian-backed Shiites, has not paid salaries for Anbar officials and Iraqi forces stationed there. Anbar’s resources and its ability to impose order are depicted as limited at best.

“Despite the success of the December elections, nearly all government institutions from the village to provincial levels have disintegrated or have been thoroughly corrupted and infiltrated by Al Qaeda in Iraq,” or a smattering of other insurgent groups, the report says.

There are just no words to describe the depths of my scorn for Bush. It is profoundly ironic that it is the president who began the so-called “war on terror” that will be responsible for establishing an Al-Qaeda state in Iraq and making Osama Bin Laden’s dream of a new Muslim Caliphate come true.

Good job, Dubya.

The Washington Post captures the immense frustration being felt by soldiers in Iraq and Baghdad. They fume at a mission without objectives, at the never-ending factional violence, the incessant patrols that seem to have limited effect, and the constant stress of roadside bombs.

When a buddy dies, they ask themselves “why, for what reason did he die?” They can’t come up with an answer.

They don’t know what they’re working for, what mission they should achieve against enemies they cannot see in a country where increasing numbers of people just want them gone. They wish for a war like World War II, with a clear enemy and clear objectives. Here in Iraq, they have none of that.

“They say we’re here and we’ve given them freedom, but really what is that? You know, what is freedom? You’ve got kids here who can’t go to school. You’ve got people here who don’t have jobs anymore. You’ve got people here who don’t have power. You know, so yeah, they’ve got freedom now, but when they didn’t have freedom, everybody had a job.”

–Spec. David Fulcher, 22, of Leesburg, VA.

The Washington Post carries an article on how the US has done practically everything wrong in countering the Iraq insurgency, and how it failed to learn the lessons of Vietnam. Chief points:

*Iraq Administrator Paul Bremer’s first order of business was the “De-Baathification of Iraq,” which resulted only in driving an entire movement underground and thus setting the stage for the insurgency.

*The Army’s approach to quelling unrest after the invasion was to have lots of “boots on the ground,” but planners failed to account for the humiliation felt by Iraqis about a western occupier, and the approach became entirely counterproductive when public opinion began to turn against the US.

*The approach to gathering intelligence about the insurgency was to round up thousands of people and interrogate them abusively (most of which ended up being of no value intelligence-wise), at the same time that the counter-insurgency intelligence operation was undermanned and poorly organized. This only resulted in increased resentment by Iraqis, and causing many to be incarcerated for weeks or months thereby giving insurgents in the prison population plenty of time to recruit them.

*Bremer and others obstinately refused to learn from the Vietnam example, even ignoring counterinsurgency textbooks written during that period that in retrospect apply very clearly to what the US is experiencing.

*The Army insisted on conducing an unconventional war conventionally, sending out large numbers of troops and batallions to deal with the insurgency (such as in Fallujah.) This only fomented further insurgency. Rather than seeing the Iraqi people as a playing field, their minds and beliefs should have been seen as the prize. When the Army sent large numbers of troops in to counter an unconventional war, the heavy casualties inflicted on civilians ensured that their hearts and minds would be with the insurgency and against the Americans.

Overall the article is a very interesting read, and a good look into what is turning out to be an extremely expensive and bloody mistake.