Centerblue.org

It seems the British ambassador to Iraq isn’t the only one being candid these days–generals testifying before Congress today are offering a similarly bleak assessment on the likelihood of Iraq devolving into civil war.

“I believe that the sectarian violence is probably as bad as I have seen it,” Gen. John Abizaid, the commander of U.S. Central Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee. Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, echoed Abizaid’s observation, saying “We do have the possibility of that devolving into civil war.” He said whether this occurs depends on the Iraqis more than on the U.S. military. “Shiite and Sunni are going to have to love their children more than they hate each other,” Pace said, before the tensions can be overcome. “The weight of that must be on the Iraqi people and the Iraqi government.”

God save us all.

The assessment comes amid reports that up to 2/3 of army units are not in a state of operational readiness because of the strain and damage their equipment has suffered in Iraq. I’m sure that makes our military’s men and women feel really confident about their likelihood of survival in a mission that makes no sense.

Thankfully Donald Rumsfeld decided he wasn’t “too busy” after all to testify about this ever-worsening fracas and his disastrous policies before the US Congress.

The Washington Post captures the immense frustration being felt by soldiers in Iraq and Baghdad. They fume at a mission without objectives, at the never-ending factional violence, the incessant patrols that seem to have limited effect, and the constant stress of roadside bombs.

When a buddy dies, they ask themselves “why, for what reason did he die?” They can’t come up with an answer.

They don’t know what they’re working for, what mission they should achieve against enemies they cannot see in a country where increasing numbers of people just want them gone. They wish for a war like World War II, with a clear enemy and clear objectives. Here in Iraq, they have none of that.

“They say we’re here and we’ve given them freedom, but really what is that? You know, what is freedom? You’ve got kids here who can’t go to school. You’ve got people here who don’t have jobs anymore. You’ve got people here who don’t have power. You know, so yeah, they’ve got freedom now, but when they didn’t have freedom, everybody had a job.”

–Spec. David Fulcher, 22, of Leesburg, VA.

The Washington Post carries an article on how the US has done practically everything wrong in countering the Iraq insurgency, and how it failed to learn the lessons of Vietnam. Chief points:

*Iraq Administrator Paul Bremer’s first order of business was the “De-Baathification of Iraq,” which resulted only in driving an entire movement underground and thus setting the stage for the insurgency.

*The Army’s approach to quelling unrest after the invasion was to have lots of “boots on the ground,” but planners failed to account for the humiliation felt by Iraqis about a western occupier, and the approach became entirely counterproductive when public opinion began to turn against the US.

*The approach to gathering intelligence about the insurgency was to round up thousands of people and interrogate them abusively (most of which ended up being of no value intelligence-wise), at the same time that the counter-insurgency intelligence operation was undermanned and poorly organized. This only resulted in increased resentment by Iraqis, and causing many to be incarcerated for weeks or months thereby giving insurgents in the prison population plenty of time to recruit them.

*Bremer and others obstinately refused to learn from the Vietnam example, even ignoring counterinsurgency textbooks written during that period that in retrospect apply very clearly to what the US is experiencing.

*The Army insisted on conducing an unconventional war conventionally, sending out large numbers of troops and batallions to deal with the insurgency (such as in Fallujah.) This only fomented further insurgency. Rather than seeing the Iraqi people as a playing field, their minds and beliefs should have been seen as the prize. When the Army sent large numbers of troops in to counter an unconventional war, the heavy casualties inflicted on civilians ensured that their hearts and minds would be with the insurgency and against the Americans.

Overall the article is a very interesting read, and a good look into what is turning out to be an extremely expensive and bloody mistake.